HORIZON

: 06 June 2017

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PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT

Title in the language of publication:	PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT
Author:	Corijn van Mazijk
Issue:	HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology. Vol. 6, №1 (2017), 58-78
Language:	English
Document type:	Research Article

DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2017-6-1-58-78

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Abstract
Over the past years McDowell’s conceptualist theory has received mixed phenomenological reviews. Some phenomenologists have claimed that conceptualism involves an over-intellectualization of human experience. Others have drawn on Husserl’s work, arguing that Husserl’s theory of fulfillment challenges conceptualism and that his notion of “real content” is non-conceptual. Still others, by contrast, hold that Husserl’s later phenomenology is in fundamental agreement with McDowell’s theory of conceptually informed experience. So who is right? This paper purports to show that phenomenology does not have to choose between any of these positions. Central to the outline I offer is that there are multiple approaches to non-conceptual content in play today. By separating them we can begin to oversee the diversity of phenomenological contributions to the debate about non-conceptual content. I conclude that current literature presents us with at least three sound phenomenological accounts of non-conceptual content, but also that these are generally not incompatible with conceptualism.

Key words
Phenomenology, non-conceptual content, conceptualism, space of reasons, intentionality, McDowell, Husserl.

References

Barber, M. D. (2008). Holism and Horizon: Husserl and McDowell on Non-conceptual Content. Husserl Studies, 24, 79–97.
Bermúdez, J. L. (1994). Peacocke’s Argument against the Autonomy of Non-conceptual Content. Mind and Language, 9, 402–418.
Bermúdez, J. L. (1995). Non-conceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States. Mind and Language, 10, 333–362.
Bermúdez, J. L., & Cahen, A. (2011). Non-conceptual Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-nonconceptual/
Block, N. (1995). On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18 (2), 227–287.
Block, N. (2003). Mental Paint. In M. Hahn & B. Ramberg (Eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge (165–200). Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Crane, T. (1988). The Waterfall Illusion. Analysis, 48, 142–147.
Crane, T. (1992). The Non-conceptual Content of Experience. In T. Crane (Ed.), The Contents of Experience (136–157). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crane, T. (2003). The Intentional Structure of Consciousness. In A. Jokic & Q. Smith (Eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives (33–57). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
Crane, T. (2013). The Given. In J. K. Schear (Ed.), Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate (229–250). London, New York: Routledge.
Cussins, A. (1990). The Connectionist Construction of Concepts. In M. Boden (Ed.), The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (368–440). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, D., (1986). A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In Ernest LePore (Ed.), Truth and Interpretation, Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (307–319). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
De Vries, W. (2011). Sellars vs. McDowell: On the Structure of Sensory Consciousness. Diametros, 27, 47–63.
Doyon, M. (2011). Husserl and McDowell on the Role of Concepts in Perception. In B. Hopkins & J. Drummond (Eds.), The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, XI, 42–74.
Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Dreyfus, H. L. (2013). The Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental. In J. K. Schear (Ed.), Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate (15–40). London, New York: Routledge.
Evans, G. (1982). The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hopp, W. (2010). How to Think about Nonconceptual Content. In B. Hopkins & J. Drummond (Eds.), The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy,X (1), 1–24.
Hopp, W. (2011). Perception and Knowledge: A Phenomenological Account. Cambridge University Press.
Husserl, E. (1983). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology. The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Husserl, E. (1984). Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis (Hua XIX/1, Hua XIX/2). Den Haag: Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1997). Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Husserl, E. (2001a). Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic. In R. Bernet (Ed.), Collected Works. Vol IX. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Husserl, E. (2001b). Natur und Geist: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1927 (Hua XXXII). Dordrecht: Springer.
Husserl, E. (2004). Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920 und 1924. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Kant, I. (1998). Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
Lycan, W. G. (2015). Representational Theories of Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-representational/
MacDonald, C. (2006). Self-Knowledge and Inner Space. In C. MacDonald & G. MacDonald (Eds.), McDowell and His Critics (73–89). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Mazijk, C. van (2014a). Kant, Husserl, McDowell: The Non-Conceptual In Experience. Diametros, 41, 99–114.
Mazijk, C. van (2014b). Phenomenology and Non-Conceptual Content [Review of the book Mind, Reason, and Being-In-the-World: The McDowell/Dreyfus-Debate, by J. K. Schear’s (2013)]. Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy, 2 (2), 273–278.
Mazijk, C. van (2015). Walter Hopp: Perception and Knowledge: a Phenomenological Account. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 14 (4), 1185–1191.
Mazijk, C. van (2016). Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 54 (2), 267–287.
McDowell, J. H. (1986). Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space. In P. Pettit & J.H. McDowell (Eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context (137–168). Oxford: Claredon Press.
McDowell, J. (1994). The Content of Perceptual Experience. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44 (175), 190–205.
McDowell, J. (1996). Mind and World . Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press.
McDowell, J. (1998). Two Sorts of Naturalism. In McDowell, J. Mind, Value, and Reality (167–197). Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press.
McDowell, J. (2006a). Response to Cyntia MacDonald. In C. Macdonald & G. MacDonald (Eds.), McDowell and his Critics (89–94). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
McDowell, J. (2006b). Response to MacDonald. In C. MacDonald & G. MacDonald (Eds.), McDowell and his Critics (235–240). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
McDowell, J. (2009). Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
McDowell, J. (2013). The Myth of the Mind as Detached. In J. K. Schear (Ed.), Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate (41–58). London, New York: Routledge.
Mooney, T. (2010). Understanding and Simple Seeing in Husserl. Husserl Studies, 26, 19–48.
Noë, A. (2013). On Overintellectualizing the Intellect. In J. K. Schear (Ed.), Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate (178–193). London, New York: Routledge.
Peacocke, C. (1992). A Study of Concepts . Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Schear, J. K. (2013). Are We Essentially Rational Animals? In J. K. Schear (Ed.), Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate (285–302). London, New York: Routledge.
Sellars, W. (1997). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Cambrige, MA: Harvard University Press.
Siewert, C. (2013). Intellectualism, Experience, and Motor Understanding. In J. K. Schear (Ed.), Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate (194–226). London, New York: Routledge.
Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

: 06 June 2017

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Views: 3692

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE “PHENOMENOLOGY AND PRACTICE:
THE 2ND CONFERENCE ON TRADITIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE”
(September 8-10, 2016, Gdańsk, Poland)

Title in the language of publication:	INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE “PHENOMENOLOGY AND PRACTICE: THE 2ND CONFERENCE ON TRADITIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE” (September 8-10, 2016, Gdańsk, Poland)
Author:	Jakub Buzniak
Issue:	HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology. Vol. 6, №1 (2017), 235-240
Language:	English
Document type:	Review Article

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Abstract
The report presents an overview of the International Conference on “Phenomenology and Practice: The 2nd Conference on Traditions and Perspectives of the Phenomenological Movement In Central and Eastern Europe” that took place on September 8-10, 2016 at the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism, University of Gdansk, Poland. The report characterizes the structure of the conference, presents the conference attendees and introduces the main ideas of key lectures given by the guests.

Key words
Phenomenological movement, phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, practice.

: 06 June 2017

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Views: 5277

NOTES ON FEMININITY, OR THE BIG STORY OF A LITTLE DRESS

Title in the language of publication:	NOTES ON FEMININITY, OR THE BIG STORY OF A LITTLE DRESS
Author:	Stoyan Asenov
Issue:	HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology. Vol. 6, №1 (2017), 161-180
Language:	English
Document type:	Research Article

DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2017-6-1-161-180

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Abstract
In 1926 Coco Chanel designed the little black dress and this marked the beginning of the remarkable longevity of this garment in the world of fashion. This longevity embodies the paradox of being always in fashion in a world of transience. This paradox allows us to see in the little black dress a unique story unraveling between the body and the dress, which represents the woman beyond ephemeral fashion and gives femininity a unique status. The little black dress is a phenomenon which affords us the opportunity to reveal some fundamental characteristics of the modern ways of constituting the body and femininity. An important question to answer here is how philosophy can address the understanding of this particular phenomenon. I think that even though the reconstruction of this phenomenon within the confines of the specific cultural and historical context could yield important considerations, this approach is more likely to hinder understanding because it fails to highlight the uniqueness and integrity of the subject being studied. Therefore, this text employs a different approach: understanding is only possible through a phenomenological interpretation of the “interplay” between the body, the colour black and the smallness of the dress – that is, through a phenomenological interpretation of the relationship that exists between the black clothing and the body and the “work of the small”. The main premise is that this “interplay” temporalises the body thus rendering the little black dress a phenomenon of time above all. The body leaves the physical mode of existence whereby natural femininity becomes historical and biographical. Within this context the mystique and allure of femininity are not so much exuded by the physicality of the body as are connoted by the body’s representation as a concealed story and a hidden biography. In this way the woman is enabled into a new form of existence – that of a story; however, this is not a story of the natural woman, but the story of a biographically individuated femininity. This gives new dimensions to the erotic inasmuch as it goes beyond the erotic that stems from the immediate sensation and image and becomes the erotic that stems from the imagination.

Key words
Body, femininity, temporalization, freedom, fashion, the erotic, colour, garment, imagination.

References

Asenov, S. (2014). Bitie i otsastvie. Dostoevski i opitat sas smartta [Being and Absence. Dostoevsky and the Experience of Death]. Sofia: Sofia University Press. (in Bulgarian).
Eco, U. (Ed.). (2006). Istoria na krasotata [History of Beauty]. Sofia: Kibea Pubishing House. (in Bulgarian).
Gidel, H. (2008). Koko Shanel: biografiya [Coco Chanel: Byography]. Sofia: Riva. (in Bulgarian).
Lipovetskii, Zh. (2012). Imperiya efemernogo. Moda i ee sud’ba v sovremennom obshchestve [The Ephemeral Empire. Fashion and its Destity in Modern Sosciety]. Moscow: New Literary Observer. (in Russian).

: 06 June 2017

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VASILY SESEMANN
MANUSCRIPTS. SCHELER, LOSSKY, BERGSON (1950-1955)

Title in the language of publication:	РУКОПИСИ. ШЕЛЕР, ЛОССКИЙ, БЕРГСОН (1950-1955гг.)
Author:	Vasily Sesemann
Prepared by:	Dalius Jonkus
Issue:	HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology. Vol. 6, №1 (2017), 211-234
Language:	Russian
Document type:	Manuscripts

DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2017-6-1-211-234

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Abstract
This publication presents three manuscripts of the famous Russian-Lithuanian philosopher Vasily Sesemann. We offer publications of essays on Scheler, Bergson and Lossky – these are the texts of Sesemann’s manuscript collection, which is located in Vilnius University (F122-104, F122-105, F122-106). This group of essays is integral. All these essays, in one way or another address the issue of the philosophical understanding of intuition, which Sesemann discussed in all his major works. Essays are dedicated to the philosophers who somehow influenced the author’s position. The texts were written during his stay in the camp of the GULAG (1950-1955) in Taishet (Irkutsk region). It is known that Sesemann taught Western philosophy and aesthetics for other prisoners. We can assume that these essays refer to the materials or recordings of his lectures. Among the prisoners in the same camp was Dandaron, who later became a famous scientist and created the original version of neo-Buddhism. While preparing manuscripts for publication it was discovered that in the posthumously published “Letters on Buddhism” Dandaron often recounts the thoughts of Sesemann, especially when it comes to understanding of intuition. In Dandaron’s handwritten archive in Ulan-Ude are the manuscripts, which, according to the titles and topics discussed, coincide with the manuscripts of Sesemann. From the available data we conclude that the manuscripts found in Dandaron’s archive – “The relationship between matter and spirit” and “Aesthetics” – are the recordings of Sesemann’s lectures.

Key words
Seseman, Dandaron, manuscripts, intuition, aesthetics, Scheler, Lossky, Bergson.

: 06 June 2017

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FRIEDRICH-WILHELM VON HERRMANN
“HERMENEUTICS AND REFLECTION:
HEIDEGGER AND HUSSERL ON THE CONCEPT OF PHENOMENOLOGY”
Trans. by K. Maly, Toronto: University of Toronto Press November, 2013. ISBN-13: 978-1442640092

Title in the language of publication:	FRIEDRICH-WILHELM VON HERRMANN “HERMENEUTICS AND REFLECTION: HEIDEGGER AND HUSSERL ON THE CONCEPT OF PHENOMENOLOGY” Trans. by K. Maly, Toronto: University of Toronto Press November, 2013. ISBN-13: 978-1442640092
Author:	Man-To Tang
Issue:	HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology. Vol. 6, №1 (2017), 265-271
Language:	English
Document type:	Review

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Abstract
The review provides an outline of the book and critically examines the Heideggerean hermeneutic phenomenological approach developed by F. W von Herrmann to the refutation of Husserl’s phenomenology. Reviewer traces four essential differences in author’s critical analysis of the two phenomenological approaches by Heidegger and Husserl, and problematizes several difficulties in the author’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology. On the one hand, the reviewer shows that Husserl’s phenomenology, at least, can be interpreted in two ways, namely the static approach and the genetic approach. Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, especially in Crisis, explicitly expresses his hermeneutic character. Therefore, von Herrmann’s interpretation may not be faithful to Husserl’s phenomenology as a whole. On the other hand, von Herrmann develops Heidegger’s idea of the primacy of a-reflective hermeneutics, which is a pre-theoretical primordial science. With reference to K. Popper’s and K. Jaspers’ criteria of science, the reviewer doubts that the development, which aims at going beyond reflective and theoretical science, can still be regarded as a science because it cannot meet any established criterion.

Key words
Husserl, Heidegger, von Herrmann, hermeneutics, phenomenology, reflection, a-phenomenology, givenness.

References

Jaspers, K. (1963). General Psychopathology. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Popper, K. (2002). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Rouledge.
Heidegger, M. (2009). History of the Concept of Time. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1999). Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie (orig. 1919) (GA 56/57). Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Husserl, E. (1994). Randbemerkungen Husserls Zu Heideggers “Sein und Zeit” und “Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik”. Husserl Studies, 11 (1-2), 3–63.
Herrmann, F.-W. von (2013). Hermeneutics and Reflection: Heidegger and Husserl on the Concept of Phenomenology. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

: 06 June 2017

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INTERVIEW WITH CLAUDE ROMANO

Title in the language of publication:	БЕСЕДА С КЛОДОМ РОМАНО
Author:	Ruslan Loshakov
Issue:	HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology. Vol. 6, №1 (2017), 241-264
Language:	Russian,French
Document type:	Interview

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Abstract
What is the event? How the phenomenology of event is possible if the “event” is not the phenomenon in the classical meaning of this word? French philosopher Claude Romano discusses these questions with his Russian colleague Ruslan Loshakov. The interlocutors consider the concept of event in different contexts, paying special attention to the relationships which connect the phenomenology of event with Husserl, Bergson, Heidegger and Levinas’ ideas.

Key words
Event, fact, time, present, diachrony.

References