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EMPLOTMENT AND THERAPEUTIC INTERACTION:
PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOTIVES IN MEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF CHERYL MATTINGLY

Abstract
This article focuses on the phenomenological aspects of Cheryl Mattingly’s empirical research. Cheryl Mattingly is one of the brightest representatives of modern American medical anthropology. Medical anthropology – actively developing social science – often, especially since the end of the 80-ies of the last century, refers to the conceptual resources of phenomenological philosophy to justify their methodological and value priorities. Such reference is connected with the attention of medical anthropologists to the subjective experience of illness and health, to the meaning of suffering, to patients’ storytelling, to situational effects of clinical interactions, to the changes in the life-world of man caused by serious chronic diseases. The first part of the article explicates the theoretical framework of the version of the applied phenomenology, which is offered by Mattingly in her long-term research conducted in 1990s and 2000 years. The subject of these research works was clinical interactions between occupational therapists and their patients. The analysis of these interactions is based on Paul Ricoeur’s phenomenologically grounded thesis that between the narrative and the experience of time there is an isomorphism thanks to the binding force of the plot. Mattingly brings the concept of narrative and a series of accompanying characteristics from the sphere of philosophical narratology to the sphere of phenomenology of (inter)action. The main idea of Mattingly is that the action itself has a narrative structure, – in the sense that actors themselves perform emplotment of interaction, configure the current events in a way that they are built into a whole, namely therapeutic history in which each successive episode of therapy follows from the previous one. The second part of the article illustrates on example of real therapy session how these ideas work in practice, in the process of the interpretation of particular therapeutic interactions. In general, we are planning to show that, although Mattingly’s appeal to phenomenological context is not systematic, and it is more correct to speak of the phenomenological “motives” in her work, it can be treated as one of the most interesting applications of phenomenological philosophy in the field of social sciences.

Key words
Therapeutic interaction, narrative, practice, time, experience, phenomenology, emplotment.

References

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LANGUAGE, DESCRIPTION AND NECESSITY. WAS WITTGENSTEIN’S PHENOMENOLOGY A HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY?

Abstract
In this article we would like to prove that the so-called Ludwig Wittgenstein’s phenomenology was not the phenomenology in Husserlian sense. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thought is most often associated with analytical philosophy, pragmatism or a specific metaphilosophical programme. Conversely, the philosopher is rarely considered as belonging to the phenomenological school. What remains problematic is whether 1) Wittgenstein did in fact practice some form of phenomenology and, if so, 2) what school of thought should it be related to? Both problems may be brought down to one basic question of 3) what is phenomenology? The answer to this last question, albeit tentative, will help us answer questions one and two. We can give a preliminary answer to our third question. We could say the following: phenomenology is a method to describe what is given for description and how it is given in terms of analysing the conditions under which an object may appear. As such, it is a transcendental way to encapsulate conditions determining the possibility of any experience. We may ask now whether Wittgenstein was a phenomenologist by this definition of phenomenology. If we conclude that he was not, we will try to answer our second question – can we talk of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology in any other sense, much as we do in the case of phenomenologies of Mach, Einstein or Austin. Ludwig Wittgenstein used the word phenomenology to describe his philosophy twice. First, in his notes from 1929 which later served as material for the posthumously published Philosophische Bemerkungen, and then in 1951 in a collection of notes published as Bemerkungen über die Farben. Let us consider what he wrote in 1929.

Key words
Description, grammar, Husserl, phenomenology, phenomenological language, philosophical methods, space, Wittgenstein.

References

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INTENTIONALITY: AN AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW.

Abstract
The matter of the article is to give an outline of American theories of intentionality and to compare it with E. Husserl’s phenomenology. It is one of the first Russian systematic studies of American theories on intentionality that is represented here. It is John Searle’s philosophy that is the main American theory of intentionality. Some other thinkers (R. Chisholm, J. Findlay, N. Rescher, E. Thompson, D.W. Smith, etc.) are studied here too. Searle treats intentionality as a natural quality of consciousness. He forbids the linguistic approach; intentionality is understood from the point of view of humanistic (internal) realism. Intentionality is successive when the subject is satisfied by his acquaintance with the object. The main feature of intentionality is aspectuality that has the subject of not eliminated subjectivity of any conscious act and the first person ontology. Searle proposes the collective intentionality that is analogous to phenomenological intersubjectivity. E. Thompson proposes the synthetic theory of intentionality that unites phenomenology, philosophy of consciousness and neural science. D.W. Smith proposes the theory of intentional context. He rejects the study of atomistic intentional acts. Husserl’s and Searle’s theories of phenomenology may be united in several main points: 1. Experience is an internal process; 2. Experience cannot be separated of aspectuality; 3. Intentionality cannot be eliminated in any conscious act; 4. The other mind can be considered only from internal point of view; 5. There is collective intentionality of mankind. There are several distinctions between Husserl and Searle: 1. Searle is an realist on intentionality, Husserl puts on an idealistic concept of it; 2. Searle considers intentionality from empirical point of view, not from the rationalist one; 3. Searle is an adept of skepticism about self, he rejects transcendental concept of cogito. But irrespective of distinctions there is convergence of analytical and phenomenological views in contemporary philosophy of consciousness.

Key words
Intentionality, phenomenology, analytical philosophy, epistemology, consciousness, subject, experience, intersubjectivity.

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