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THE INTRINSIC REFLEXIVITY OF THE PHENOMENON
AND THE AUTONOMY OF PHENOMENALIZATION:
ON HOW RICHIR CARRIES OVER THE HUSSERLIAN PROJECT

Abstract
Husserl was the first to clarify the specificity of the phenomenological realm. A phenomenon is an articulated whole whose intensity and richness are parallel to its purity. It is under the guidance of this coalescence that we re-examine the final clause of the Principle of principles («Ideen» I, § 24), often misinterpreted as a limitation of phenomenality. However, Richir’s phenomenology of the nothing-but-phenomenon («rien que phenomena») remains faithful to the final clause of the Principle of principles in that it does not surpass the (nothing-but-) phenomenon in the name of any extra-phenomenological instance. Contrary to the apperceptions emerging from symbolic institution, the nothing-but-phenomenon takes place in the element of a concrete indeterminacy that phenomenalizes itself according to a reflexivity (intrinsic to the phenomenon) that develops itself all along an essentially transpassible phase of presence. Therefore, phenomenalization takes the form of a flickering (clignotement) that, in its final state, becomes autonomous and calls up subjectivity itself. Linked to the hyperbolic épochè, the vertigo of this autonomization outlines what Richir calls the beyond copernican turn (l’au-delà du renversement copernicien) leading thereby a non-standard phenomenology, which takes the form of an architectonic of the various levels of phenomenalization.

Key words
Phenomenalization, reflexivity, phenomenological flickering, apperception, Principle of principles, concrete indeterminacy, transcendental correlation, symbolic institution, architectonic, transpassibility, the «beyond copernican turn», hyperbolic épochè, Marc Richir, Edmund Husserl.

References

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• Richir, M. (1976). Au-delà du renversement copernicien: la question de la phénoménologie et de son fondement. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
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• Varela, P. (2012). Concrétudes en concrescences. Annales de phénoménologie, (11), 7–56.

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MONADOLOGY, CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE IMMORTAL „I“
(LEIBNIZ, KANT AND HUSSERL)

Abstract
This paper aims to research the different views of Leibniz, Kant and Husserl concerning the immortality of the «I». For this purpose I will read the Monadology from a phenomenological perspective, but taking into account Kants exposition of the Paralogismes in the Critic of Pure Reason. There he points out the illusion which consists in taking the identical, but finally empty representation of the «I» for the givenness of his real substantiality, even his possible persistency after death. Because of this appearance which arises again and again from our very self-awareness we trend to assert that the «I» could persist indefinitely, besides that he couldn’t be annihilated at all due to internal causes or to an antagonism with circumstances of the external world. But in spite of the force of this critic, we can find in Leibniz‘ Monadology and somehow in Husserls‘ writings drafts of another conception of the self- awareness which includes the experience on an organical continuity of the body. In the face of Kants‘ critic, this conception could perhaps raise new phenomenological questions about the relationship of self-awareness, mortality and even immortality of the «I». Thereby I want to show to what extent the question about the giveness or not-giveness of a certain infinity contribute to renew the meaning of a phenomenology of the death and the experience of mortality.

Key words
Leibniz, Kant, Husserl, monad, self-awareness, infinity, immortality.

References

• Altobrando, A. (2010). Husserl e il problema delle monade. Turin: Trauben.
• Belaval, Y. (1995). De l'âge classique aux lumières. Lectures Leibniziennes. Paris: Beauchesne.
• Husserl, E. (1966). Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918–1926. (Hua XI). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
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• Husserl, E. (2006). Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934). Die C-Manuskripte. (Hua Materialien Vol. VIII). New York: Springer.
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• Leibniz, G. W. (1996 a). Kleine Schriften zur Metaphysik. (Philosophische Schriften. Vol. 1). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
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TOWARDS INTENTIONAL NATURE OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Abstract
The problem addressed in this paper is the genesis of the empathetic, intersubjective intentionality which underlies second- person interactions. This theme is one of the most intriguing in contemporary philosophy and interdisciplinary research. The article seeks to elucidate the foundations of the phenomenon of the оther which we always already have in our daily embodied practices. First, we present a critical analysis of some aspects of the theory of intersubjectivity, such as analogical inference, anonymity of intersubjective being, inaccessibility of immediate experience of the Other. Then, based on such topics, as corporeity, the enactive nature of subjectivity, historical and social aspects of subjectivity, we elaborate the concept of empathy as lying at the very foundation of any encounter with the Other. As a result, we demonstrate the closeness of Husserlian idea of non-objectifying intentionality to the empathetic approach in contemporary philosophy. As precursors of the latter we mention M. Buber, L. Wittgenstein, M. Sheler, who advocate the dialogical (second-person) structure of consciousness and its em/ sympathetic nature. We also present an interpretation of empathy as an exclusive and unique form of intentional relation (E. Thompson) which permits to experience the Other in а direct, immediate way from second-person percpective (Sh. Gallagher). The analysis of empathy is also promising for contemporary interdisciplinary studies of affective consciousness, which are also mentioned. The article stresses the necessity of further studying «being-with» in both phenomenological and interdisciplinary dimensions to the extent that intersubjectivity constitutes the sense of the self on both transcendental and experiential levels.

Key words
Affectivity, corporeity, tradition, anonymity, sociality, embodied practices, intentionality.

References

• Borisov, E. V. (1999). Problemy intersubectivnosti v fenomenologii [Problems of Intersubjectivity in Phenomenology]. In V. V. Anashvili, A. L. Pogorel'skii (Eds.), Logos 1991–2005. Izbrannoe v 2 T. T. 2. [Logos 1991–2005. Selected Articles in 2 Volumes. Volume 2]. Moscow: Territory of the Future Publ.
• Carman, T. (1999). The Body in Husserl and Merlo-Ponty. Philosophical Topics, 27 (2), 205–226.
• Dillon, M. C. (1998). Merleau-Ponty's Ontology. USA: Indiana University Press.
• Gallagher, S. (2001). The Practice of Mind: Theory, Simulation, or Interaction? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8 (5–7), 83–108.
• Gallagher, S. (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Husserl, E. (1959). Erste Philosophie. Zweiter Teil. (Hua VIII). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1973 a). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Zweiter Teil. (Hua XIV). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1973 b). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Dritter Teil. (Hua XV). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Lee, Nam-In. (2006). Problems of Intersubjectivity in Husserl and Buber. Husserl Studies, (22), 137–160.
• Meltzoff , A. N., & Moore, M. K. (1997). Explaining Facial Imitation: A Theoretical Model. Early Development and Parenting, (6), 179–192.
• Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of Perception. London, NewYork: Routledge.
• Overgaard, S. (2010). The Problem of Other Minds. In D. Schmicking, & Sh. Gallagher (Eds.), Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science (255–268). USA: Springer.
• Sheets-Jonstone, M. (2006). Essential Clarifications of “Self-Affection” and Husserl's “Sphere of Ownness”: First Steps Toward a Pure Phenomenology of (Human) Nature. Continental Philosophy Review, 39 (4), 361–391.
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• Stolorow, R. D., & Atwood, G. E. (1987). Clinic Psychoanalysis. An Intersubjective Approach. London: The Analytic Press.
• Thompson, E. (2001). Empathy and Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8 (5–7), 1–32.
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• Welton, D. (Ed.). (1999). The Essential Husserl. Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology. USA: Indiana University Press.

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FROM FLESH TO REVOLT: THE PASSIVЕ ACTIVITY IN THE FAMILY IDIOT

Abstract
This article exposes a tension within Sartre's Philosophy and his concept of praxis in relation with the role to be played by the flesh and the dimension of passivity. Our guideline will be the theory of passive activity that Sartre develops in The Family Idiot. We will wonder how action may emerge at the heart of a flesh that is inseparable from a familial and social milieu whose power of conditioning is so profound that Sartre calls it a destiny. Is the specific form taken by praxis in Flaubert's existence – namely a passive activity – to be regarded as a weakened form of praxis? Should we contrast passive activity and sheer praxis? Secondary and primary praxis? Parasitism and revolt? We will first show in this article, by studying Sartre's analyses regarding the flesh in Being and Nothingness and in The Family Idiot, that the capacity for action cannot be reduced to a metaphysical nothingness: the temporal ek-stasis that defines every existent becomes a capacity for praxis only from within the flesh, a flesh that is still prior to the separation between the mother and the child. According to Sartre, a process of polarization and attunement, the institution of rhythms and dynamisms then give birth to a subject capable either of outright praxis or, as in Flaubert's case, only of passive praxis. The discovery of an essential link between praxis and fleshly dynamism will lead us, secondly, to question the role that passivity may always play in activity and to reappraise passive activity. In this regard Sartre's reflections develop along two different directions and pose a problem. On the one hand, Sartre makes clearly known his disagreement with Flaubert's thesis that praxis is impossible and revolt useless. On the other hand, he demonstrates that Flaubert invented a passive activity that possesses a genuine power of subversion. We will contend that the tendency to apprehend passive and active activities in terms of dualism and hierarchy is to be overcome. There must be an essential continuity between them, to such an extent that passive activity is the key for all revolution.

Key words
Existentialism, ethics, politics, flesh, activity, passivity, praxis, revolution, Flaubert, Sartre.

References

• Flaubert, G. (1930). Lettre à Emile Zola, 15 août 1878. In L. Conard (Ed.), Correspondance. Vol. Vlll. Paris.
• Macé, M. (2007). Penser par cas: Pratiques de l'exemple et narration dans L'Idiot de la famille. Recherches et travaux, (71), 79–91.
• Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris: Gallimard.
• Merleau-Ponty, M. (1995). La Nature. Notes de cours au Collège de France (1957–1960). Paris: Seuil.
• Merleau-Ponty, M. (1998). Notes de cours sur L'origine de la géométrie de Husserl (1960). Paris: PUF.
• Merleau-Ponty, M. (2003). L'institution. La passivité. Notes de cours au Collège de France (1954–1955). Paris: Belin.
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ONTOLOGIES AND PHENOMENOLOGIES OF THE POLITICAL BODY:
WAYS OF THE ANALOGY. A READING OF CLAUDE LEFORT

Abstract
This paper focuses on the analogy between the body and the political body, and presents the problem that is still – for our political time – this very analogy. It is done, at first, by following and developing the original work of the French political thinker Claude Lefort, who changed the terms and even the meaning of political phenomenology itself. Yet, if Claude Lefort’s inheritance has to be increased in phenomenology, his thought also reveals a strange paradox which opens with it a critical confrontation that a second article will fully develop, and that is here synthesized: indeed, the analogy of the political body is at the same time what in its very refusal unifies contemporary political philosophies – dismissing the analogy either as the language of another age of politics or as the language of the totalitarian wish of reincorporation –, and what nevertheless continues to resist implicitly in all these political writings, even if it is at times under the mask of the complicated lexicon of some Flesh of the social. By coming back to the concept of Flesh itself and its origin in the thought of M. Merleau-Ponty, the end of the article opens a confrontation between the political phenomenology renewed by Claude Lefort and our own attempt to phenomenologically reform the analogy of the political body.

Key words
Political body, institution, history, democracy, totalitarism, flesh, analogy.

References

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