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WRITING AS A MODEL OF CULTURAL SEDIMENTATION AND MEMORY: FERRARIS, DERRIDA AND HUSSERL

DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2023-12-1-103-114

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Abstract
Despite their creativity, cultural actions are not established out of nothing. They are based on previous actions, their passive or active memory, and extension. Sedimentation is the depositing of sediments that occurs during certain processes. They testify to the processes that have taken place and themselves become significant links or traces. Different layers of sediment are formed, which testify to past events, which have structures in the present. The best-known phenomenological concept of sedimentation was formulated in Husserl’s text The Origin of Geometry. Husserl uses the specific geological term of sedimentation to describe the science of geometry as a linguistically (written) mediated genesis of conceptual knowledge. The human practice of knowledge can be transmitted to other generations only by expressing it linguistically and recording it in writing. Derrida used the phenomenological concept of sedimentation and created Grammatology. The main idea of documentality is that a particular kind of social objects, namely documents (records of social acts) are the ground of social reality. For all three philosophers, writing or recording becomes a model for reflecting on cultural-social reality. The purpose of this article is to discuss the writing as a model for cultural sedimentation and memory. Husserl understood writing as a sedimentation that must be reactivated. However, Derrida and Ferraris identify the written objects only with materialized writing and the repetition of what is written. They do not distinguish between imitative and comprehensive reading.

Keywords
mobile phone, writing, memory, sedimentation, phenomenology, Ferraris, Derrida, Husserl.

References

• Blomberg, J. (2019). Interpreting the Concept of Sedimentation in Husserl’s “Origin of Geometry”. Public Journal of Semiotics, 9 (1), 78-94.
• Derrida, J. (1978). Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (J. P. Leavey, Trans.). Jr. Stoney Brook/New York: Nicolas Hays.
• Derrida, J. (1997). Of Grammatology. (G. Chakravorty Spivak, Trans.). Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
• Ferraris, M. (2013). Documentality: Why it is Necessary to Leave Traces (R. Davies, Trans.). New York: Fordham University Press.
• Ferraris, M. (2014). Where are You? An Ontology of the Cell Phone. Fordham University Press.
• Husserl, E. (1954). Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem. In Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phanomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phanomenologische Philosophie (Hua VI) (365-386). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (2001). Logical Investigations, Vol. 1 (J. N. Findlay, Trans.). London: Routledge.
• Husserl, E. (1984). Logische Untersuchungen, Bd.2, Teil.2 (Hua 19/2) (U. Panzer, Ed.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Plato. (2005). Euthypro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus (H. North Fowler, Trans.). London: Harward University Press.

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A PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND A POSTSTRUCTURALIST READING OF BEING AND TIME (SECTIONS 54–60)

DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2023-12-1-159-172

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Abstract
The article builds on Husserl’s “trivial” observations from the manuscript Reason — Science. Reason and Morality — Reason and Metaphysics on the topic of conscience, to then question the neglect of the topic of misguided conscience or self-deception in Heidegger’s model of conscience from §§ 54–60 of Being and Time. In Heidegger’s conception of conscience (as a silent call appealing to the authenticity of Dasein) we will not find a number of points important to the Husserlian understanding of conscience: neither the unrevealed horizons of prior life, nor the relativity of intersubjective contexts, nor a misguided (and doubting) conscience, still less a search for (presumed) evidence. That said, the way Heidegger axiomatically sets up the original culpability of Dasein creates a number of dead ends or blind spots in this model. It is to these that Mark Richir addresses in his interpretation (or, more precisely, two alternative interpretations), speaking of the “original symbolic mishap” that befell Dasein, and then of the “symbolic tautology” in which it has become a prisoner. Richir’s critique is not aimed at “overcoming” Heidegger’s model of conscience, but at demonstrating a transcendental illusion — probably inevitable for one who is guided by “authenticity” and the “inner voice.” This is a kind of critical phenomenology of “authenticity”, which manages to avoid the closedness of phenomenology in itself by “grafting” in it poststructuralism. This is why both the first and the second interpretation by the Belgian phenomenologist focus on the problem of symbolic structures: “original symbolic mishap” in the first case and “symbolic tautology” in the second.

Keywords
call of conscience, guilt, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Marc Richir, phenomenology, poststructuralism.

References

• Artemenko, N. A. (2015). Die “ethische” Dimension der heideggerschen Philosophie: die Frage nach der ursprünglichen Ethik. Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology, 4 (1), 114–123.
• Chernavin, G. I. (2022). Symbolic tautology. Great Russian Encyclopedia. Retrieved from https://znaniya.org/c/simvolicheskaia-tavtologiia-71fbf5.(In Russian)
• De La Boétie, É. (1846). Oeuvres complètes d’Estienne de La Boëtie. Paris: J. Delalain.
• De La Boétie, É. (1952). Discourse on Voluntary Servitude. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Izd-vo AN SSSR Publ. (In Russian)
• Heidegger, M. (2002). Being and Time. Rus. Ed. St. Petersburg: Nauka Publ. (In Russian)
• Heidegger, M. (2006). Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: M. Niemeyer.
• Heidegger, M. (2007). What is Metaphysics? Rus. Ed. Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt Publ. (In Russian)
• Heidegger, M. (2017). Was ist Metaphysik? Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
• Husserl, E. (2014). Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie. Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instinkte. Metaphysik. Späte Ethik. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908–1937) (Hua XLII). Dordrecht: Springer.
• Richir, M. (1991). Du sublime en politique. Paris: Payot.
• Richir, M. (2004). Phantasia, imagination, affectivité. Grenoble: Millon.
• Richir, M. (2014). Phénomène et hyperbole. In C. Sommer (Ed.), Nouvelles phénoménologies en France (43–54). Paris: Hermann.
• Plato. (1990). Feag. In Sobranie sochinenii v 4-kh t. T. 1 (112–124). Rus. Ed. Moscow: Mysl’ Publ. (In Russian)

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CALL FOR PAPERS
HORIZON. STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY
Special Issue (Vol. 13, No. 1, 2024)
“Analytical Philosophy & Phenomenology”

Abstract

Do phenomenology and analytic philosophy have common topics to talk about? Answering this question is not easy since the criteria for what today can be considered analytic philosophy or phenomenology are rather vague and often controversial. It is difficult to say whether in both cases we are talking about a philosophical movement, a distinctive style of philosophizing, or a particular intellectual climate in research. Many, however, are not particularly bothered by the existence of such criteria. It is enough, in their view, to regard analytic philosophy and phenomenology as notional labels that help in one's thinking as a first approximation. One can, of course, speak of two philosophical traditions in order to point to a certain set of problems and methods for solving them. But in this case, too, we are faced with the obvious fact that this totality of problems and methods is of an open character. For example, in the case of analytic philosophy it is difficult to say whether it has an orthodox core, or what might be considered its official teaching. Whereas in the case of phenomenology the role of orthodoxy still seems to be played by the works of E. Husserl. However, "heresies" today coexist quite peacefully with orthodoxy, and are often favorably perceived by it as its legitimate heirs and successors.

Nevertheless, despite the vagueness of the criteria for belonging to the either tradition, phenomenology and analytical philosophy have something in common. And that "something" could serve as a basis for a dialogue between traditions. As a historical phenomena, the two traditions have their origins in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Moreover, they have at least one common source – the works of G. Frege, which inspired B. Russell and E. Husserl, the two official founding fathers of analytic philosophy and phenomenology, respectively. However, more than a century after the birth of these philosophical traditions, it can be said that they have had different fates, both in terms of their internal development and in terms of their spread and influence on the humanities. Shared origins do not yet guarantee any mutual understanding or interest in each other.

Indeed, apart from the origins, another common feature for both traditions is their almost complete disregard for each other, at times reminiscent of the Cold War. This is even more surprising given that both traditions initially declared rigor, clarity, and systematic approach in solving certain problems. Of course, one cannot deny the fact of their mutual, albeit latent, influence on each other. For example, one of the most prominent representatives of analytical philosophy, W. Sellars, began by studying phenomenology under the supervision of M. Farber. And this could not but be reflected in his works, although he rarely mentioned Husserl. After all, it was thanks to phenomenology that concepts such as intentionality, intersubjectivity, and constitution became commonplace in analytic philosophy. And this is not only about concepts, but also about research topics and ways of posing problems. Otherwise, however, this mutual influence was more limited to restrained malevolence and disparaging remarks.

Today, however, the situation is gradually changing, and we can observe how both traditions are converging in a variety of fields of research, be they problems of linguistic meaning, perception, other minds, etc. From the frequent calls for dialogue, philosophers seem to have finally moved on. Therefore, in addition to the history of the relationship between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, the prospects for their further collaboration are of particular interest today.

We would be glad to see materials devoted to the following headings, although they, of course, may not be limited to this list:

Language and knowledge

• Meaning and sense
• Certainty and reliable knowledge
• Conceptual and non-conceptual content of experience
• The problem of the world
• Intersubjectivity
• A priori knowledge

Psychology

• Consciousness and perception
• The problem of other minds
• Intentionality
• Free will
• Phenomenology and Cognitive Science
• Mental causality
• Psychology of perception
• Mind-body problem

Society, history and ethics

• History of the relationship between analytic philosophy and phenomenology
• A comparative analysis of problems and methods of analytic philosophy and phenomenology
• Ethics
• Value judgments
• Society and Lifeworld
• History and Narrative

The articles can be written in Russian and English – both languages are acceptable (acceptable volume of an article should have 30.000-50.000 characters including spaces, footnotes, references, abstracts and key words).

Please find the link to the Author Guide over here

Deadline for submissions: December 1, 2023
Deadline for decision: January 15, 2024
Deadline for publication: June 30, 2024

Please send your formatted submissions to: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. & This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

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CALL FOR PAPERS
HORIZON. STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY
Special Issue (Vol. 13, No. 2, 2024)
“Phenomenology & Aesthetics”

Abstract

The upcoming issue is dedicated to the relationship between phenomenology and aesthetics. The problematic field of phenomenology and aesthetics can be viewed in two ways: on the one hand, it refers to the questions that phenomenology raises within its own discourse, on the other hand, this is a theory of art that chooses phenomenology as its primary method. The goal of the release is to demonstrate the ability not only to build a dialogue within one's own phenomenological tradition, but also to find points of intersection with a broader area of art theory.

Phenomenology, despite its initial interest in the theory of knowledge, reveals a close connection with aesthetics. In Husserl’s work “Aesthetics of Consciousness”, presumably written in 1912, phenomenology is presented as a philosophical direction that most closely and consistently explores the problems of aesthetics. Such connection is not accidental. Both Kant’s aesthetics and phenomenological reduction radically transform the natural attitude interested in the existence of real things and direct our attention to ways of their manifestation. Following Husserl, authors such as M. Heidegger, M. Merleau-Ponty, M. Dufrenne, R. Ingarden turn to problems in aesthetics. So, M. Merleau-Ponty develops the phenomenology of the body, the intertwining of the experience of the world and the experience of the body, which can be seen through painting. M. Heidegger offers the most radical formulation of the question of the being of the work of art, expanding the boundaries of phenomenology to the realm of inaccessible, elusive, and phenomena hidden from our contemplation. M. Dufrenne reinterprets the meaning of aesthetic experience, the essence of intentionality, and the possibility of the subject's openness to things through a poetic vision of the world. In the aesthetics of R. Ingarden and N. Hartmann, a multi-layered structure of an aesthetic object is presented, in which the reality of the material layer is distinguished from the particularity of the layer of the imaginary.

Further development of the relationship between phenomenology and aesthetics can be traced in the works of J.-L. Marion, M. Henry, O. Becker, and M. Richir and in the works of experts in the field of aesthetics such as W. Welsch, R. Shusterman, G. Böhme, L. Wiesing, and A. Berleant. The authors mentioned share not only an interest in art, aesthetic consciousness, and aesthetic experience, but also a particular emphasis on transitional, flickering, elusive, unstable, and fragile phenomena perceived by the subject.

This interest is driven primarily by the need to rethink the already established tradition of phenomenology, to discover new perspectives in the study of Edmund Husserl's legacy, to revise classical concepts of intentionality and phenomenological reduction. Thus, reflecting on unstable and transitional phenomena requires different ways of describing the consciousness of the subject. All of these aspects are possible thanks to a deeper analysis of aesthetic categories and works of art. The work of art can be considered as a phenomenon with dynamic structure capable of setting in motion and depriving the perceiver of solid foundations. For instance, M. Richir emphasizes the relevance of the concept of imagination in E. Husserl's work, thus offering an alternative to the opposition between real/imaginary or the contrast between figurative/non- figurative art. He discovers its intermediate space, which is neither reducible to the real nor to the imaginary. The ability to perceive such an intermediate and dynamic creation raises the question of the contradiction of the concept of intentionality of the subject captured by the dynamic nature of the artistic phenomenon.

The rethinking of the aesthetic experience takes on particular significance in the philosophy of A. Maldiney. Maldiney goes beyond the limits of the concept of experience and attempts to describe a radical experience of an event that transforms and changes the subject when encountering the dimension of the impossible. J.-L. Marion examines the space of the icon, the phenomenon of the idol, flesh, events, and introduces the concept of "saturated phenomenon" which allows us to reconsider the relationship between contemplation and intentionality, including in the space of painting. Alongside the established tradition of phenomenological aesthetics, the theory of art in the form of literary theory, architecture, cinema, and other arts consider phenomenology as a method for conducting their own research. For instance, phenomenology is one of the most important directions in contemporary architectural theory. Architectural theory based on the studies of M. Merleau-Ponty and M. Heidegger turns to describing the experience of perceiving architectural space, reveals the existential significance of place in human existence, reflects on the bodily rootedness of humans in the world. The context of architectural theory is particularly important for the critics of the role of vision in the subject's experience. Shifting the emphasis to the bodily connection of a human with the surrounding environment allows us to speak about human not only as a detached observer, but also as a subject who inhabits and actively participates in the fullness of the world. At the same time, attention to place implies a description of its eventful and ritual structure, which lacks completeness and is permeated with elusive, disappearing, invisible dimensions, bringing architectural theory closer to the problems of phenomenological aesthetics. This statement becomes resonant with authors and aestheticians who draw from phenomenology. It is close to Shusterman’s corporeal aesthetics, the ideas of phenomenological aesthetics of the environment, and the aesthetics of involvement of Berleant. Also, this topic is significant for the aesthetics of visual arts. Thanks to recent developments in installation, video, and computer art, aesthetics is gradually moving away from the categories of detached contemplation and critical interpretation, bringing to the forefront the bodily and emotional involvement of the viewer. In this context, aesthetics questions the model of visual distance for more traditional forms of art as well. For example, R. van de Vall proposes a tactile and affective concept of image in his book “At the Edges of Vision.” Drawing on the philosophy of M. Merleau-Ponty, E. Levinas, J.-F. Lyotard, and G. Deleuze, on the one hand, and on the theory of new media, on the other, van de Vall develops a performative phenomenology of aesthetic reflection, visuality, and the visual arts. The film theory (by L. Marks, V. Sobchak, J. Barker) refers to phenomenology to understand the perception of the viewer, its aesthetic experience, and the genesis of aesthetic experience, it raises a question about the reality of the image, about the cinema's ability to create a unique bodily experience that is transmitted to the viewer. The theory of modern dance (M. Sheets- Johnstone, S. Kozel, E. Brannigan) and performance (E. Fischer-Lichte, B. Massumi, R. Schechner) continues the trajectories of thought of the phenomenology of the body by Merleau-Ponty.

The problematic fields and intersections of aesthetics, phenomenology, and art theory reflect a common tendency towards bringing together phenomenological aesthetics with practical and everyday aspects of life, with corporeality and embodiment, and with the characteristics of the experience of the contemporary subject.

Possible topics include, but are not limited to:

• The relationship between phenomenology and classical aesthetics
• Phenomenology and art
• Aesthetic consciousness in the phenomenology of E. Husserl
• Phenomenology of painting, phenomenology of poetry, phenomenology of music, phenomenology of architecture, literature, cinema, etc.
• Aesthetic experience in phenomenology
• Problems in the history of the development of phenomenological aesthetics
• The place of aesthetics in (post)phenomenology
• Phenomenology of urban environment
• Kantian aesthetics in the context of phenomenology (on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of Kant’s birth)

Please find the Author Guide here.

Deadline for submissions: May 1, 2024

Deadline for decision: June 15, 2024

Deadline for publication: December 30, 2024

The articles can be written in Russian, English and German — all three languages are acceptable (acceptable volume of an article should have 30.000-50.000 characters including spaces, footnotes, references, abstracts and key words).

Please send your formatted submissions to:

This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. (Svetlana Nikonova)

This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. (Liubov Iakovleva)

Article/Publication Details
Views: 1528

HUSSERL AND DERRIDA ON THE PROCESS OF SENSE FORMATION—GAPS AND EXCESSES

DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2023-12-1-74-102

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Abstract
This paper deals with the problem of the origin of sense and meaning. For Husserl, the determination of the ideal identity of something new can only take place retroactively in the totality of the preceding series by stepping back towards the original foundation of sense. In this regard, J. Derrida questions the ideality of the same as presence and the possibility of retrieving any arché of sense in his writings Speech and Phenomena and Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry. Phenomenology is not oblivious to these difficulties, as results from a closer reading of the correlation between idealities and sensory experience: It will show that there are at least four interrelated gaps in the Husserlian phenomenology which testify the difficulty in grasping a retraceable arché of sense. First, the gap between the ideality of sense and its representation. Second, the gap between sensory and categorial intuitions, whereby both exceed one another. Third, the gap between the ideality of sense and the sense which exceeds our expectations. Fourth, the gap between the experience of the new that overcomes us and its apprehension by consciousness. Hence, there is a fundamental gap between the conceptual idealities and the essential indeterminacy of our phenomenological sensory experience, which is correlative to an excess of one in respect to the other. In this sense, Derrida’s concepts of « différance » and “invention” allow us to conceive of this self-givenness of sense as the expression of its constant self-renewal. This expression takes the form of a trace, which, neither present nor absent, suspends meaning and full presence, leaving the narrative “open” for the reinvention of sense.

Keywords
arché, differánce, excess, event, gap, meaning, presence, sense, trace.

References

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• Bernet, R. (2004b). La vie du sujet. Paris: PUF.
• Bernet, R. (1995). Derrida and His Master’s Voice. In W. Mc. Kenna & J. C. Evans (Eds.), Derrida and Phenomenology (1–21). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
• Breuer, I. (2015). Husserls Lehre von den sinnlichen und kategorialen Anschauungen. Der sinnliche Überschuss des Sinnbildungsprozesses und seine doxische Erkenntnisform. In Ch. Asmuth & P. Remmers (Eds.), Ästhetisches Wissen (231–245). Berlin-Boston.
• Breuer, I. (2019a). Ideation und Idealisierung: Die mathematische Exaktheit der Idealbegriffe und ihre Rolle im Konstitutionsprozess bei Husserl. META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy, XI (2), 547–568. Retrieved from http://www.metajournal.org/articles_pdf/547-568-breuer-meta-2019-no2-rev.pdf
• Breuer, I. (2019b). Husserl und die kritische Rehabilitierung der aristotelischen Ontologie. Husserl Studies, 35, 203–224.
• Breuer, I. (2020a). Towards a Phenomenological Metaphysics. The Contingent Core of the Ego and of all Eidetic Forms. In J. Apostolescu & C. Serban (Eds.), Husserl, Kant and Transcendental Phenomenology (213–234). Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Breuer, I. (2020b). Ort, Raum, Unendlichkeit. Aristoteles und Husserl auf dem Weg zu einer lebensweltlichen Raumerfahrung. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
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• Derrida, J. (1978b). Force and Signification. In A. Bass (Trans.), Writing and Difference (3-30). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
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