Studies in Phenomenology



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WELSH TALIA
THE CHILD AS NATURAL PHENOMENOLOGIST: PRIMAL AND PRIMARY EXPERIENCE IN MERLEAU-PONTY'S PSYCHOLOGY
Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2013, 194 P.
ISBN: 978-0-8101-2880-4

Title in the language of publication: WELSH TALIA
THE CHILD AS NATURAL PHENOMENOLOGIST: PRIMAL AND PRIMARY EXPERIENCE IN MERLEAU-PONTY'S PSYCHOLOGY
Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2013, 194 P.
ISBN: 978-0-8101-2880-4
Author: Iulian Apostolescu
Issue:HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 3, №1 (2014),  268-271
Language:English
Document Type:Review
PDF (Downloads: 3005)

Abstract
This review is devoted to one of intriguing topics in psychological literature of 20th century — primary phenomenological world of a child. The author, American philosopher Talia Welsh, addresses to Merleau-Ponty’s thought, which is indubitable a challenging and fruitful in this sphere, grounded on Abstract: phenomenological and postmodern traditions. The essential feature of his thought consist in elaboration of ecological, existential structure of child’s experience: in his being-in-the-world and his being-with-others. Besides, Merleau-Ponty surmounts husserlian taboo in the respect of natural sciences, appealing to a number of psychological, psychoanalytical, empirical data. Welsh elucidates one of the controversial thesis of French philosopher about syncretic sociability of child’s way of being. According to Merleau-Ponty, at first there is no discrete sense of the self and sense of others, due to more fundamental apriori of any interactive, intersubjective being, which is anonymous and asubjective, but social life. Welsh demonstrates actuality of Merleau-Ponty’s ideas, addressing to contemporary research of child’s experience of the others in interdisciplinary sphere (Sh. Gallagher, A. Meltzoff, B. Stawarska etc.) The significant idea of this book is to refresh our look on the nature of subjectivity. In situation of primary experience of the world and others, before any theoretical stance, which provokes us to generalize and to universalize our experiential content, we already understand it, them in phenomenological, existential stance, by acting in our primary environment and existing toward to, with others. Several psychological examples confirm this idea. Welsh makes a point of connection Merleau-Ponty’s ideas with ones of Marx and Freud, who unmask the idea of absolute truth in a favor of hermeneutical understanding of factical life.

Key words
Syncretic sociability, intersubjectivity, self, primary experience, gestalt, psychology, interdisciplinary.