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TOWARDS INTENTIONAL NATURE OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Abstract
The problem addressed in this paper is the genesis of the empathetic, intersubjective intentionality which underlies second- person interactions. This theme is one of the most intriguing in contemporary philosophy and interdisciplinary research. The article seeks to elucidate the foundations of the phenomenon of the оther which we always already have in our daily embodied practices. First, we present a critical analysis of some aspects of the theory of intersubjectivity, such as analogical inference, anonymity of intersubjective being, inaccessibility of immediate experience of the Other. Then, based on such topics, as corporeity, the enactive nature of subjectivity, historical and social aspects of subjectivity, we elaborate the concept of empathy as lying at the very foundation of any encounter with the Other. As a result, we demonstrate the closeness of Husserlian idea of non-objectifying intentionality to the empathetic approach in contemporary philosophy. As precursors of the latter we mention M. Buber, L. Wittgenstein, M. Sheler, who advocate the dialogical (second-person) structure of consciousness and its em/ sympathetic nature. We also present an interpretation of empathy as an exclusive and unique form of intentional relation (E. Thompson) which permits to experience the Other in а direct, immediate way from second-person percpective (Sh. Gallagher). The analysis of empathy is also promising for contemporary interdisciplinary studies of affective consciousness, which are also mentioned. The article stresses the necessity of further studying «being-with» in both phenomenological and interdisciplinary dimensions to the extent that intersubjectivity constitutes the sense of the self on both transcendental and experiential levels.

Key words
Affectivity, corporeity, tradition, anonymity, sociality, embodied practices, intentionality.

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