Article/Publication Details
Views: 232

INTRODUCTORY CONTEXTS TO ANALYSIS OF PASSIVE CONSTITUTION IN E. HUSSERL’S WORKS OF VARIOUS PERIODS

Abstract
The article examines the development and context of the problem of passive constitution in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. The thematization of passive synthesis arises primarily in the later period of his work — in the Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, the Crisis of European Sciences, the Cartesian Meditations, as well as in the investigations on intersubjectivity (Husserliana XIII–XV). However, the groundwork for this later analysis can already be discerned in Husserl’s earlier writings, such as Ideas I, Ideas II, and the Lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. In these texts, Husserl distinguishes between the active and passive spheres of consciousness: the proto-synthesis of time, secondary passivity (as the result of past activity of the ego), and auxiliary perceptual syntheses that ensure continuity of experience. Although a systematic thematization of passivity is not yet present, these analyses already reveal a stratified structure of the passive sphere and its role in the constitution of subjectivity. In the later Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, the focus shifts: passivity is understood both as a condition of the normal course of perception and as the associative flow that ensures the continuity of consciousness. Thus, the development of Husserl’s treatment of passivity can be seen as a movement from implicit distinctions to a systematic explication of passive syntheses, thereby opening the way to a genetic phenomenology of subjectivity.

Keywords
Husserl, phenomenology, passive synthesis, proto-synthesis of time, secondary passivity, genetic phenomenology, subjectivity.

References

• Artemenko, N. (2019). The Problem of Passive Constitution in Husserl’s Genetic Phenomenology. Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology, 8 (2), 409–444.
• Husserl, E. (1950). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie (Hua III). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Hua IV). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1959). Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion (Hua VIII). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1960). Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology. Dordrecht: Springer Science + Business Media.
• Husserl, E. (1962). Phänomenologische Psychologie (Hua IX). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1966). Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918–1926 (Hua XI). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl E. (1969). Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917) (Hua X). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1970). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (D. Carr, Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
• Husserl, E. (1973a). Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge (Hua I). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1973b). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster Teil. 1905–1920 (Hua XIII). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhof.
• Hussel, E. (1973c). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil. 1921–1928 (Hua XIV). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1973d). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil. 1929–1935 (Hua XV). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhof.
• Husserl, E. (1973e). Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907 (Hua XVI). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1976). Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie (Hua VI). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1980). On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917) (J. B. Brough, Trans.). Dordrecht: Springer Science + Business Media.
• Husserl, E. (1983). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book. General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology (F. Kersten, Trans.). Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer.
• Husserl, E. (1989). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book. Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution (R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer, Trans.). Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer.
• Husserl, E. (2001). Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental Logic (A. J. Steinbock, Trans.). Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer.
• Landgrebe, L. (1982). Das Problem der passiven Konstitution. In Faktizität und Individuation: Studien zu den Grundfragen der Phänomenologie (71–87). Hamburg: Meiner.
• Landgrebe, L. (2010). Der Begriff des Erlebens. Ein Beitrag zur Kritik unseres Selbstverständnisses und zum Problem der seelischen Ganzheit. Würzberg: Königshausen & Neumann.
• Lee, N. (1993). E. Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
• Yamaguchi, I. (1982). Passive Synthesis und Intersubjektivität bei Husserl. Den Haag: M. Nijhoff.