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КАК ГУССЕРЛЕВСКАЯ ТЕОРИЯ ТЕЛЕСНОГО САМОКОНСТИТУИРОВАНИЯ EGO МОЖЕТ ПОМОЧЬ ПРЕОДОЛЕТЬ РАЗРЫВ В ОБЪЯСНЕНИИ?

Аннотация
Разрыв в объяснении — кажущаяся непреодолимой пропасть между физическими, телесными процессами и состояниями, с одной стороны, и субъективным, переживаемым опытом, с другой — принадлежит к величайшим проблемам современной философии сознания и посвященных сознанию эмпирических исследований. Согласно некоторым исследователям — таким, как элиминативистски настроенные философы Пол и Патрисия Черчланд — это псевдопроблема. Однако, с нашей точки зрения, строгая феноменологическая рефлексия на собственное сознание убеждает внимательного и осмотрительного философа в том, что этот вопрос является более чем реальным и фактически решающим. В настоящей статье предпринята попытка показать, что гуссерлевская теория телесного самоконституирования ego, вместо того чтобы устранять разрыв в объяснении на редукционистский манер, может, скорее, помочь нам перебросить через него мост, выявляя необходимую связь между субъективной, феноменальной стороной опыта и его телесным базисом. Согласно такой интерпретации, гуссерлевская концепция телесности может даже служить более строгим и прочным теоретическим основанием исследования сознания, нежели любое из тех, которые в настоящее время лежат в основе эмпирических исследований истоков сознания в природном мире. В первой части своего исследования я очерчиваю попытку Тодда Файнберга и Джона Маллата преодолеть и, вслед за тем, устранить разрыв в объяснении, в ходе которой они движутся от внешнего мира к внутренней сфере сознания. Во второй части статьи представлен феноменологический анализ, который призван показать, что гуссерлевское решение этой проблемы подразумевает движение в противоположном направлении — от внутренней сферы сознания вовне, к внешней, физической реальности.

Ключевые слова
разрыв в объяснении, телесность, философия сознания, Эдмунд Гуссерль, самоконституирование, трансцендентальное и эмпирическое ego, трудная проблема сознания.

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