Studies in Phenomenology



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BUDDHISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MINDFULNESS MEDITATION

Title in the language of publication: BUDDHISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MINDFULNESS MEDITATION
Author: PRADEEP P. GOKHALE
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 7, №2 (2018),  452-471
Language: English
Document type: Research Article
DOI: 10.21638/2226-5260-2018-7-2-452-471 PDF (Downloads: 3082)

Abstract
Unlike most other philosophical systems of India, Buddhism, though it gives a central place to “consciousness” in its philosophical enquiry, does not raise its status to a transcendental metaphysical level. Buddhism, in this way, has a special affinity with the phenomenological approach. The present paper focuses on the points of a contact between phenomenology and mindfulness meditation, the Buddhist spiritual practice. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part gives an account of the four kinds of mindfulness meditation based on the Buddha’s sermons on mindfulness. Then it focuses on their core features, namely, “objectivity”, “impermanence and other essential features” and “dynamic, yet passive awareness”. These features bring the two approaches close to each other. The second part brings out similarities and differences between the two approaches. The phenomenological approach, like the approach of mindfulness meditation regards consciousness as being of the intentional and propositional nature. It also emphasizes immanent to consciousness and brackets transcendent to it. Both approaches exhibit a scientific temperament and both tend to be presupposition-less. In spite of these close similarities, there are glaring differences between these two approaches. The phenomenological inquiry is aimed at intellectuality, whereas that of the Buddhist approach is spiritual. Phenomenology attributes reality to essences, whereas there is a tendency to deny ontological status to essences in Buddhism. Husserl’s acceptance of transcendental or pure ego contrasts with the no-self theory of Buddhism. Intentionality attributed to consciousness is also alien to all forms of Buddhism. The third part of the paper asserts the similarities and differences between the two approaches open to various possible forms of phenomenological practice. Furthermore, the paper suggests that different models of phenomenology are possible within Buddhism.

Key words
Mindfulness meditation, consciousness, svalakṣaṇa, sāmānyalakṣaṇa, emptiness, intentionality, essences, pure ego, presuppositionless approach, propositional consciousness, objectivity.

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